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Monitoring the Peace? : Northern Ireland’s 1975 ceasefire incident 
centres and the politicisation of Sinn Féin. 
 
During the Provisional IRA’s (PIRA) 1975 ceasefire, two different sets of 
incident centres were established across Northern Ireland in order to 
monitor and avert escalation of violence between Republicans and Security 
Forces.  While one group of these offices were run by the Northern Ireland 
Office (NIO) and administered by clerks in the Northern Ireland Civil Service, 
very quickly Sinn Féin (taking advantage of their decriminalisation in 1974) 
established their own incident centres to coordinate their communication 
with the government. This article argues that the establishment of the Sinn 
Féin incident centres set a precedent for the future political activity of the 
Provisional Republican Movement; that their activity during the 1975 
ceasefire played an important formative role in the evolution of the group’s 
political strategy; and that this experience, acquired from the work done 
during the 1975 truce, was of far greater influence than is appreciated in 
current accounts.        
 
The period surrounding the PIRA’s 1975 ceasefire has recently become the site of a large 
amount of new research due in equal measure to the availability of new archive resources1 as well as 
the rich comparisons that can be drawn between this failed ceasefire and the PIRA’s later attempts 
in 1994 and 1996.2 The emphasis of the new studies has often been to look in detail at the talks 
between the British Government and the PIRA leadership and have come to broadly similar 
conclusions on the following fundamental points: that Prime Minister Harold Wilson managed 
contact with the IRA in their initial weeks whilst at the same time  considering the option of some 
kind of British ‘withdrawal’3 from Northern Ireland; that support for such a withdrawal was the 
‘majority view’4 of much of Wilson’s Labour Cabinet but that priorities changed and these talks failed 
due to pressures on both the IRA5 and the British government.6    
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The focus of much of this new research, though important in debating both the importance 
of the ceasefire specifically and the utility of secret backchannel talks more generally, remains 
narrowly focused around those at the top of both the IRA and the British Government at the time. 
With the IRA however, the case can be made that such an approach misses the important point that 
the Provisional IRA were the leading arm of a ‘deeply rooted working-class ethno-nationalist 
movement’7 and therefore one that still had to be representative in at least some respects of the 
communities, members and organisers through which they operated. Despite this, accounts of the 
work of the incident centres has never before been seen as central to the narrative of the 1975 
ceasefire and their work is notable for its absence even in accounts of Provisional IRA strategy. This 
paper seeks to demonstrate that these incident centres gave Sinn Féin and PIRA activists practical 
political and representative experience for the first time, particularly in Belfast and Derry and that 
this experience occurred at a level far below that of the Army Council and their talks via the ‘Derry 
Link’ with the British. It was also different in form from the largely theoretical debates that occurred 
in this time within the prisons. Thus this article demonstrates that while the incident centres were of 
frustratingly limited use for much of the ceasefire, their function and form set a precedent for 
Provisional Sinn Féin’s later political organisation, whether that be in the organisation of support for 
the 1981 Hunger Strikes, in the later election of its representatives, in the arrangement of 
community justice and punishment attacks, or in the later support of the peace process. This article 
argues that the Sinn Féin incident centres were the functional antecedents of the Sinn Féin Offices 
that became prominent in Northern Ireland’s towns and cities from the 1980s and thus are the 
direct ancestors of the ‘Armalite and Ballot Box' strategy of the 1980s in a way that has not yet been 
fully appreciated.  
Although the above may sound a fairly simple and logical historical observation to make, it is 
one that is important as it contradicts the widely accepted narrative of the development of 
Provisional Sinn Féin, and, ultimately, the origins of the Peace Process.  This narrative has a tendency 
to focus around the personalities of Gerry Adams, Danny Morrison and Martin McGuinness, whose 
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political careers – they have insisted – were dependent on their opposition to the 1975 ceasefire (or 
at least, to its outcomes). Presented by a diverse range of academics and journalists from Peter 
Taylor to David McKitterick and Eamonn Mallie; and from Ed Moloney to MLR Smith this narrative is 
united on the following points:  
1. The 1975 truce was a disaster for the Provisional movement.8 
2. The PIRA Army Council had been fooled into calling a ceasefire that was designed to 
erode their military capacity by inertia.9 
3. It allowed for the ending of ‘Special Category Status’ for paramilitary prisoners 
without serious protests from republicans.10 
4. It led to the later acceptance of a no-ceasefire stance to which Martin McGuinness 
and Gerry Adams were central.11 
5. It led directly to the new predominance of PIRA Northern Command and the ousting 
of prominent Southerners from both Sinn Féin and the PIRA Army Council.12     
Such rare historiographical agreement between a diverse range of respected research regarding the 
emergence of the new and northern Sinn Féin in the 1980s has undoubtedly made an impact on how 
the Republican movement is studied whether historically, or contemporaneously. This is epitomised 
in the weight given to the role of Adams and McGuinness in the 1990s in bringing (and keeping) the 
Republican movement at talks and in government. This narrative’s immutability is demonstrated 
most clearly in Martyn Frampton's recent book The Long March where Frampton argues clearly – 
albeit with one specific reservation – that his work on the movement's ‘[representative] political' 
strategy begins at the moment that strategy became conspicuous, in 1981. Therefore, while 
Frampton considers the 1975 ceasefire as a potential starting point for his study on Sinn Féin’s 
political strategy, he quickly comes to the conclusion that ‘it was only in the aftermath of the hunger 
strike that the movement began to view ‘politics’ as a serious project.’13 Andrew Sanders’ recent 
work also serves to highlight the perception that the PIRA after 1976 made a clean break with that 
which had come before, in doing so excluding the possibility of continuity of policy and describing 
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the 1975 ceasefire as ‘the split that never was.’14  MLR Smith states similarly that prior to the 1981 
Hunger Strike the Provisional Movement had no political interests whatsoever and that their 
reliance on a purely anti-colonial platform ‘provided them with an argument to legitimise their 
campaign of violence free from any political dimension because in their view there could not, 
literally, be any politics so long as the colonial relationship lasted.’15   Frampton, Sanders and MLR 
Smith’s analyses accept the received logic by glossing over Sinn Féin's actions prior to the Hunger 
Strike and ignoring the potential for influence from the period of the 1975 truce. Doing this, serves 
to place Gerry Adams and his cohort of so-called ‘Young Turks’ very much at the centre and as the 
originators of policy within the Provisional Republican Movement, but only after they had risen 
through the ranks unblemished by experience of the anomalous 1975 truce.   
The emergence of this standard narrative has not gone unnoticed. Richard English warned in 
2003 that ‘the conspicuously political emphasis of the republican movement in the mid-1990s has 
sometimes caused observers, in contrast, to underplay the degree to which earlier Provisionalism 
had a political energy and content to it…. It was always political when it thought it expedient and 
sensible to be so.’16  The assumptions made above have been most recently examined by Robert 
White who argues that the Provisional IRA’s leadership was not, in fact, overrepresented by 
southerners, that they were not tricked into negotiations by the British, that they did not slip into 
sectarianism due to a lack of leadership in 1975, and that in fact the Provisional IRA was ‘not 
significantly harmed by the truce’17 despite what later republican leaders said.18  
White’s intervention can be extended further. This article argues that the later advancement 
of Sinn Féin (and northern Sinn Féin at that) was aided by experience of political organisation prior 
to the arrival of the Adams/McGuinness leadership and that to date the politicisation of Sinn Féin to 
the 1980/81 Hunger Strikes is to disregard the experience gained by a significant number of the 
Provisional Movement’s activists during the 1975 truce. Kacper Rekawek has recently noted that in 
the 1980s the movement to the Armalite and Ballot Box strategy required the Republican Movement 
to increase the number (and influence) of non-military activists within its organisation.19 In a sense, 
Dr Tony Craig  March 2013 t.craig@staffs.ac.uk  
5 
 
the incident centres of 1975 are the first example of the Provisionals moving in this direction, 
acquiring these skills and politicising themselves.    
Incident Centres were established in 1975 as a direct result of how the PIRA’s previous 1972 
ceasefire negotiation structures had been established and because of the manner in which that 
ceasefire had broken down. MI6’s Frank Steele, on secondment to Northern Ireland since 1971, 
became advisor to the newly appointed Secretary of State William Whitelaw in March 1972. Steele 
had already been in contact with Dáithí Ó Conaill – then presumed Chief of Staff of the Provisional 
IRA – via a number of different intermediaries since February 1972.20 Through John Hume and the 
SDLP, Steel attended face to face discussions in Derry that culminated in a ceasefire and a secret visit 
to London by a PIRA delegation in July. These talks included, both Martin McGuinness and Gerry 
Adams (who had been specifically released so that he could participate) and in the course of these 
talks it was agreed that a so-called ‘incident hotline’ would be established at Laneside, the building 
used for discreet talks between a whole range of government officials and political, religious, 
community and paramilitary figures throughout this period. This hotline was basically the office 
telephone number, with a messaging service for when Frank Steele was elsewhere.21  
While he may have been in charge of the talks, Steele did not have control over the security 
forces in Northern Ireland and the fact that security was being handled by a different section of the 
NIO proved problematic when issues and misunderstandings arose as a result of using the hotline. 
The fact that anyone could telephone Steele for any reason was also problematic. Only days after 
the fractious Cheyne Walk meeting in London for example, Ó Conaill used the hotline to talk to 
Steele about his worries over the British Army’s resistance to the occupation of vacant homes in the 
Lenadoon area of West Belfast by homeless Catholic families. Ó Conaill was concerned that the local 
Belfast commander Seamus Twomey would bring his men into conflict with the British Army over 
the issue but Steele refused to act.22 Later, Steele received another phone call which he thought was 
from Twomey.23 According to Peter Taylor – based on an interview with Frank Steele: 
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‘Because of the IRA attitude at the London meeting, Steele was determined that 
the IRA should not think that HMG would do anything just to preserve the 
ceasefire, and was therefore deliberately laid-back about the escalating crisis in 
Lenadoon Avenue. When... O’Connell said the ceasefire was breaking down, 
Steele said it was a pity, but he hoped to see O’Connell again soon.’24 
Steele did not step in to resolve the crisis that eventually broke the 1972 ceasefire – the 
Lenadoon affair – nor could he have stopped the shooting of a further five Catholic civilians 
(including a 13 year old girl and a priest) by British soldiers five miles away in Ballymurphy.25 The 
hotline between negotiators was ill-equipped to deal with the minutiae of contentious incidents on 
the ground when the same channels were being used to discuss the broader political problem itself. 
It was accepted by all parties that future ceasefires would need a systematic incident reporting and 
aversion scheme.    
Seamus Loughran, although interned shortly after the Lenadoon affair, had been one of 
Steele’s initial contacts with the IRA.  Once released in 1974, Loughran returned to a public role 
within Sinn Féin (and a private one on the PIRA Army Council26) and soon made contact once more 
with Laneside. Steele’s two successors, Michael Oatley and James Allan spoke with Loughran fairly 
regularly in the summer of 1974 as Sinn Féin’s Belfast spokesman. Although initially Loughran 
emphasised his concern about prison conditions, he also spoke of how previously he had felt that 
the officials at Laneside had ‘looked down on me as if I was something that had crawled out of a 
bog.’ A position that was radically different by July 1974.27 Following the Sunningdale agreement of 
December 1973 which established a power sharing executive between Northern Ireland’s main 
political parties, the role of Laneside had expanded significantly and with the Secretary of State’s 
decriminalisation of both the UVF and Sinn Féin in April 1974, the representatives of these two 
groups were free to speak to Laneside officials beyond those working for MI6 and without the need 
for pseudonyms.28 Certainly this was in part due to the NIO’s desire (under the leadership of their 
highly regarded Permanent Secretary Frank Cooper) to engage with and in so doing attempt to 
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crystallise the extreme paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland around more conventional forms of 
party politics. This tactic may not have achieved instantaneous success with either the UVF or the 
PIRA though it arguably created empathy between the paramilitary representatives and the British 
officials they were dealing with, and this was hugely important to the way in which the 1975 
ceasefire was later handled.    
By the autumn of 1974 however there were too many potential Republican backchannels 
coming forward. These usually well-meaning individuals were complicating and diluting the 
messages being transmitted between the two sides.  To complicate matters further, talks at Laneside 
were publicised in detail by the New Statesman in November29  and the names of the British Officials 
leading the talks were leaked by Robert Fisk in The Times in January.30  
When a first ceasefire, arranged to be an extension of the Christmas ceasefire of 1974/5, 
collapsed in the middle of January, both the PIRA and the British primarily blamed the amount of 
contradictory information being passed through the numerous political backchannels for their 
numerous misunderstandings. There is some evidence to suggest that both the Secretary of State 
and the IRA specifically held Seamus Loughran’s to blame in this regard.31 Loughran had given an 
unauthorised submission to the government’s Gardiner Commission in which he gone far beyond 
the IRA leadership’s stated position had embracing the potential end of internment (and with it, 
Special Category Status) for paramilitary prisoners.32  Possibly for his own safety, Loughran went to 
New York on a fundraising trip during the crucial weeks between the two ceasefires (his visa was 
unopposed by the NIO, and the Secretary of State even commented in his diary ‘Loughran... made 
such a mess of it that I think he is lucky not to have been shot by the Prov. IRA and he has gone off to 
America’33). On his return, Loughran was dropped from the PIRA Army Council.  Thus, by the time 
the ceasefire was arranged, the backchannel contacts were discreetly reduced from around half a 
dozen to really only one which mattered, and one which didn’t, the secret Derry Link between 
Brendan Duddy and the PIRA Army Council was maintained, and the occasional Laneside chat with 
the Belfast Provisionals that was maintained through Billy McKee and Jimmy Drumm.  
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Of the other links, those with Conciliation Ireland, Rev. Arlow and even Dáithí Ó Conaill’s 
personal link through Dr John O’Connell were dropped at this time,34 and Rees made a statement in 
which he outlined why any future would more suitable structures for communication,  
‘Many ill founded rumours are circulating. There is much speculation. There is a 
real need to distinguish fact from fiction and those who report have a particular 
responsibility at this time to avoid turning speculation into expectation.’35 
Rees outlined his approach to the House of Commons on 11 February 1975: 
 ‘...my officials put to Provisional Sinn Féin a scheme designed to make 
effective arrangements for ensuring that any future cease-fire did not break 
down. 
 ‘This has five main elements. First, a number of incident centres, manned 
by civil servants on a 24-hour basis, will be established in various parts of 
Northern Ireland. These centres will be linked with my office in Belfast. Second, if 
developments occur which seem to threaten the cease-fire, these incident 
centres will act as a point of contact in either direction. Third, issues can be 
referred to my office in Belfast and clarified there. Fourth, cases referred up to 
the Northern Ireland Office will be considered, and a reply passed back to the 
incident centre for onward transmission. Fifth, if out of these exchanges general 
difficulties about the cease-fire arrangements emerge, then discussions will be 
arranged between my officials and representatives of legal organisations to clarify 
them.’36 
 In response, the IRA re-sent Rees a list of 12 points that would be the basis of the new truce. 
The document included in point 9, ‘Agreement on an effective liaison system between 
British/Republican forces.’37 
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The political context in which the PIRA ceasefire was negotiated should also not be 
forgotten.  The British were working on two initiatives by the end of 1974, both with the 
intention of creating political stability in Northern Ireland whether that be through an 
enhanced criminal justice response to terrorist crimes, or the establishment of democratic 
structures that would seek agreement on the province’s governance. As already stated, the 
Gardiner Report into the imprisonment of paramilitaries was making inquiries into the 
procedures for the detention of terrorists in Northern Ireland at this stage, and reported back 
in early 1975 recommending the ending of internment without trial and the ‘criminalisation’ of 
terrorist offences in a process that would eventually lead to the ending of special category 
status for paramilitaries in prisons. The Constitutional Convention – a series of talks aimed at 
restarting a power sharing executive between the main political parties – continued, winding 
their way toward acrimonious collapse in March 1976.38 With this in mind, the regular secret 
meetings with Michael Oatley, James Allen and later Donald Middleton in Derry amounted 
only to a part of a ceasefire within a broader political process that was almost continuously 
stalling. However, with the incident centres this theoretical/political side of the ceasefire could 
continue so long as both sides wanted to meet and in fact continued long after the ceasefire 
itself was being kept in any meaningful way. The incident centres would ensure there would be 
no crossed wires, no repeat of the intransigence of Lenadoon, and that potential sore points 
would be dealt with before they were tabled at the leadership meetings in Derry. The ceasefire 
itself, it was hoped, would give enhance the stability of the otherwise unrelated Constitutional 
Convention talks taking place elsewhere.  
Thus, on 15 February 1975, with the ceasefire reinstated, the NIO established 6 
government incident centres staffed by Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) clerks 
and located in Belfast, Newry, Armagh, Dungannon, Derry and Enniskillen. Initially secret, the 
centres (codenamed TOWERs) transmitted their messages to Stormont Castle, via a teleprinter 
system known as RAMPART. The government incident centres were meant to be individual 
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links between specific known members of Sinn Féin. However, when Sinn Féin established 
their own incident centres, the government offices became the clearing houses for much 
larger numbers of complaints about Security Force activity than had been anticipated. 
Figure 1 below demonstrates how the contacts between the British and the 
Provisionals during the 1975 ceasefire were arranged. The incident centres effectively isolated 
those involved in the conflict from those involved in the talks, in turn creating a closed loop of 
exclusively northern republican activists corresponding with the NIO exclusively through the 
incident centres. There was thus a profound gulf between what the leadership of the 
Provisional Movement experienced in this period and what those on the street saw and did. 
Leaders
Movement
NIO
Security Forces
MoD
Sinn Féin 
Incident  Centres
NIO
Incident  Centres
Backchannel Talks
Provisional 
Republican Movement
British Government 
Incidents
 
In total, almost 1,000 complaints were made during the ceasefire by low-level Sinn Féin 
organisers and representatives stationed at their own incident centres regarding Security 
Force harassment. The Security Forces in turn used system around 400 times to complain 
Fig 1. PIRA 1975 Truce talks: the Incid nt Centr  arrangement. 
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about republican activity.39 A later breakdown of how they were used demonstrates the varied 
concerns of Sinn Féin on the ground in 1975.  
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Fig 2. Combined figures for incidents reported February to October 1975 
Type of Complaint Frequency 
Unacceptable Security Force [SF] patrolling 129 
General SF Harassment 258 
Arrests 251 
Searches 100 
SF Photographing, VCPs, Misc. 175 
Harassment of PSF Incident Centres 54 
Total 96740 
 
The Sinn Féin incident centres were established in key locations inside Catholic 
neighbourhoods. There, the offices were staffed by local activists and the centres followed the 
long established Republican tradition of self-reliance and self governance, at a time when Sinn 
Féin members, due to the policy of abstentionism, had no experience of elected political office 
and very limited amounts of community representation or advocacy. Their work within this 
incident centre reporting system gave many of them their first taste of local political 
organisation and engagement.  
 The Sinn Féin centres had not been part of any agreement with the British as such; and 
while their shared names caused some confusion, these centres opened their doors to their 
communities and, just as importantly, to the press during the 1975 ceasefire. In February, BBC 
Radio Ulster reported on this development in an interview with an unnamed Sinn Féin 
representative who gave an important perspective on the role of these centres: 
‘We are here to take complaints of any nature at all concerning the people 
in this estate. Complaints regarding the activities of the RUC. Activities of 
the British Army and harassment. Also incidents which happen to people 
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smashing windows, kids, acts of vandalism, people stealing cars and things 
like that… We are not acting as a police force, we are acting as a community 
service… we reject the RUC…  [we] take action ourselves. Usually it means 
coming along and talking to the people concerned.  If there is a robbery we 
try and get the money back.’41 
Although the interviewee dismissed the idea of passing on complaints to the police they did admit 
that they would phone ‘HQ in Lower Falls’ who they believed ‘are in contact with the British Army 
Authorities’ should a breach of the ceasefire occur.42 
The Irish Times along with all the other major newspapers began covering stories that 
emanated from these centres on almost a daily basis. The centres gave journalists a location 
from where their questions could be answered and they no longer had to rely on their 
secretive and clandestine contacts or the less well-informed Dublin offices. Those who ran the 
incident centres included prominent northerners like Jimmy Drumm who ran the Falls Road 
incident centre/Sinn Féin Office and was cited on at least seventeen occasions by the Irish 
Times during the truce.43  The centres gave credence, responsibility and a degree of 
respectability to those who had previously been living the covert lives of illegal guerrillas. But 
also, what is clear from press interactions with the Sinn Féin incident centres is a sense that 
those who staffed them felt they had a responsibility to reflect community feeling rather than 
impose it. The BBC Radio Ulster journalist elicited the telling quote, ‘We in Sinn Féin, 
representing the people in this area, can only do what the people ask.’44   
In Derry, the incident centres’ role in reporting breaches of the truce quickly became 
neglected. It was replaced instead by a new role of community restorative justice. Though so-
called punishment attacks on those committing anti-social behaviour were nothing new, the 
incident centres allowed Sinn Féin to go after new and different targets. In September 1975 for 
example the IRA seized alcohol from publicans accused of selling to under-age youths. The 
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plunder was put on display for both locals and the media ‘at the ceasefire incident centres in 
Bogside’ and those publicans from whom the alcohol had been seized were told they could 
only get in back by guaranteeing not to serve alcohol in future to the under-age youths.45  
 The Security Forces in general – as was noted in numerous summaries of complaints – 
took a dim view of the development of the incident centres46 and almost immediately began 
surveillance against them, questioning those who frequented them and occasionally entering 
the offices to search them.47 This was especially true of the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute 
Regiment (2Para), that summer stationed in West Belfast. 2Para, it was alleged, entered, 
searched and removed papers from the offices on several occasions in broad daylight. This 
caused incidents to be reported down the line as breaches of the truce, to the NIO. It is 
apparent from the documents recently released that the NIO’s relationship with the Ministry 
of Defence over this matter was strained48 not least because battalion commanders in 
Northern Ireland had been urged to slow-pedal in Nationalist areas since the end of 1974.49 By 
the summer, it seems, Sinn Féin incident centres had become too important for the military to 
ignore when violence was reinstating itself as the primary means of communication between 
the PIRA and the Security Forces. The NIO regularly explained the problems to the MOD and 
clearly told them that ‘the Centres are the offices of a political party and are sensitive because 
of the part they play in incident reporting. They should therefore not be ‘harassed’’50 but when 
the NIO asked that troops be sent using a ‘horses for courses’ system, the MOD’s reply was 
‘predictable but disappointing’.51  
 The public face of the Sinn Féin Incident Centres also caused great suspicion among loyalist 
groups who had not reciprocated in 1975 by calling their own ceasefire. The UDA’s Andy Tyrie got in 
touch with James Allan at Laneside, visiting him there on the evening of 26 February 1975.  This led 
to two further meetings the following day where the UDA delegation met with Frank Cooper and 
subsequently the Secretary of State. Their concern was that the opening of incident centres would 
lead to the emergence of IRA-style police forces in Catholic areas. They had not anticipated an IRA 
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ceasefire at all, and the implications of one made them nervous. The loyalists suspected the IRA had 
made a secret deal with the British ‘otherwise the present ceasefire could not be explained.’52 
Frank Cooper tried his best to allay the UDA’s fears of any sell out, ‘Provisional Sinn Fein’ he 
told them, ‘had exploited the situation cleverly. They had mounted a powerful propaganda effort 
which appeared to have taken in many people (including, by implication, the UDA) ... [but that 
surely] it was better that they expend their energies in a political way than in terrorism.’53 Allan, 
Cooper and Rees failed in their attempts to allay the UDA’s fears and upon leaving these meetings 
Tyrie announced that they intended to police loyalist areas themselves from the following evening.54  
In early 1975, division within the various loyalist groups meant that the UDA were bluffing. 
When compared to the similar meetings the UDA leadership had had at the height of the UWC 
disturbances the previous year55 far fewer now responded to the UDA call and their initiative thus 
lacked local support and quickly fizzled out. When the UDA held another meeting with Rees the 
following day, Tyrie backed down and changed his tone, making the excuse that ‘the atmosphere 
had been so pleasant [this time] that he had not found an opportunity to shout.’56 57  
 Despite the urgent assurances of the Secretary of State, the IRA ceasefire – which was 
pockmarked throughout by very serious instances of violence – was met by an increased 
loyalist paramilitary campaign which included some of these groups’ most harrowing atrocities 
of the Troubles.58 
 Loyalist violence erupted with greater ferocity than ever in 1975.The IRA’s response to 
this loyalist upsurge was often equally as sectarian by the autumn of 1975. This, along with the 
continued OIRA/PIRA feud meant that more people died in the Troubles in 1975 than in 1974 
and as a result, the government incident centres were finally closed on 12 November 1975 
following a message from RAMPART that advised the TOWER centres to ‘Make no further 
attempt to telephone your contact. If you are yourself contacted please say “This incident 
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centre is closed”… After 5pm you may stand down and it will not be necessary to man your 
centre overnight.’59 
Within the IRA itself the work of the incident centres became seen as a farce by more 
than the hawks alone. Jimmy Drumm told the Irish Times  on 13 November that ‘the incident 
centres had outlived their usefulness.’60 Seamus Loughran echoed Drumm and the Irish Times 
noted that, ‘[Loughran] said last night that they would be no loss, ‘for all the use they have 
been during recent times.’61  The PIRA in Derry however had already made their feelings on 
this point known, having blown up their own office on 10 November.62 
 Such was the ignominious nature of the long descent back into violence, the IRA have 
ever since referred to this period as the darkest in the most recent Troubles. They have argued 
that fighting loyalists and each other distracted them from whom their real fight was with. 
Certainly their political agenda did not countenance many of the atrocities committed by the 
PIRA in the autumn of 1975, these included continued bomb attacks in Britain, and the 
sectarian murder of Protestants such as at Newtownhamilton’s Orange Hall on 1 September 
1975.63 However the argument that the Provisional Movement’s own hawks - often referred to 
simply as ‘northerners’ – emerged with a new strategy under the leadership of Adams and 
McGuinness following the opportunities presented to it by the Hunger Strikes64 is a flawed 
over-simplification. The perception of Belfast Republicans at the time was made in an official 
statement a few days after the closure of the government centres and indicates a 
consciousness already within the IRA that the ceasefire was part of Britain’s attempt ‘to 
‘politicise’ the struggle.’  This statement added however that ‘Sinn Féin advice centres would 
remain open, including the main centre on Belfast’s Falls Road’, indicating clearly that there 
was not to be a complete rejection of the practice of open politics.65  
In fact the story of the 1975 truce, seen from the perspective of the incident centres is 
almost entirely a story of Northerners, and hawks at that. From Billy McKee, to the staff of the 
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Incident Centres including Jimmy Drumm66 and Seamus McCusker67, these were men who had 
spent the previous five years engaged in some of the most horrendous fighting Irish 
Republicans had ever known. They had been interned and beaten, had killed and been killed in 
the name of the same goal as their successors.  The army council contained numerous 
Northerners too at this time, all of whom were closely involved in the talks, even if those talks 
were never going to achieve their stated aim. 
 The Sinn Féin Incident Centres were essential to the 1975 ceasefire and furthermore 
gave the Provisional Movement a public face that it had not shown before. Although the 
vigilante element of this was never welcomed by the NIO, the offices that remained allowed 
Sinn Féin to become more visibly active in their communities than before. In the NIO’s words 
Sinn Féin was clearly 'politicising' itself, and this was cautiously welcomed.68 To accept this 
conclusion one does not need to rule out the importance of Adams, Morrison and McGuinness 
later in the 1980s and 1990s, but it does highlight the fact that as a movement, the 
Provisionals were larger than these three figures and that they were altered by the historical 
precedent of these incident centres, in a way that many accounts have ignored.  In fact, the 
incident centres mark the first foray into political representation for the Provisional Republican 
Movement, and marked out the pattern for the future communal and political practices of 
Provisional Sinn Féin. 
In 1977, Jimmy Drumm gave the Provisional Movement’s Wolfe Tone commemoration 
address at Bodenstown cemetery.  In what is widely regarded as the moment that ‘Northern 
Command’ gained ascendancy over the movement, Drumm concluded that: 
‘we need to make a stand on economic issues and on the everyday 
struggles of people... an irrepressible mass movement will ensure mass 
support for the continuing armed struggle in the north.’69 
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This speech, written by the future Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams, explicitly links the 
movement’s interests with those of the communities within which they operated. It implies a 
responsibility to represent their wider interests despite its continued irredentism and 
commitment to armed conflict. The rejection of the previous leadership’s policies of ceasefire-
then-negotiate therefore did not mean the rejection of that strategy’s offspring in the form of 
local Sinn Féin offices.  From the incident centres, Sinn Féin had acquired the embryo of its 
later existence as a more conventional political party, albeit one which would continue to 
reject the authority of the institutions of the Northern Ireland state for some time to come.  
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